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No Philosophy for Swine:
John Stuart Mill on the Quality
of Pleasures
M I C H A E L H A U S K E L L E R
University of Exeter
I argue that Mill introduced the distinction between quality and quantity of pleasures in
order to fend off the then common charge that utilitarianism is ‘a philosophy for swine’
and to accommodate the (still) widespread intuition that the life of a human is better, in
the sense of being intrinsically more valuable, than the life of an animal. I argue that in
this he fails because in order to do successfully he would have to show not only that the
life of a human is preferable to that of an animal on hedonistic grounds, but also that
it is in some sense nobler or more dignified to be a human, which he cannot do without
tacitly presupposing non-hedonistic standards of what it means to lead a good life.
Much has been written about John Stuart Mill’s distinction between
quantity and quality of pleasures, but no consensus has been reached
about its coherence and tenability, or lack thereof. Early critics of the
distinction, such as Green,1 Bradley2 and Moore3 who all argued that
the distinction defied Mill’s professed hedonism, are often rebuked
today for their allegedly ‘misdirected and insubstantial’ criticism of
Mill.4 It seems to me, though, that their objections hit the mark
perfectly. The object of this article is to show, by going through his
argument step by step and highlighting the import of certain passages
that have hitherto been widely ignored, that Mill fails to achieve what
he set out to achieve, namely to defend utilitarianism against the (at
that time) potentially fatal charge that it is a philosophy ‘worthy only
of swine’.
I. INTRODUCING QUALITY
The distinction between quantity and quality of pleasures is introduced
in the second chapter of Mill’s Utilitarianism, in which he explains
what utilitarianism is and where he responds to several objections that
1 Thomas Hill Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 5th edn. (Oxford, 1906), pp. 183–90.
2 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1927), pp. 116–22.
3 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 77–81.
4 Wendy Donner, ‘Mill’s Utilitarianism’, p. 264, The Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed.
John Skorupski (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 255–92.
© Cambridge University Press 2011 Utilitas Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2011
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have been raised against it. One of these is based on a then common
reaction to the idea that pleasure and freedom from pain are, as the
utilitarian creed holds, the ‘only things desirable as ends’.5 There must
have been quite a few of Mill’s contemporaries to whom this axiological
assumption appeared implausible on the grounds that surely there
are ‘better and nobler’ objects of desire and pursuit than pleasure. To
suppose otherwise can only be ‘mean and grovelling’, for in doing so
the utilitarian seems to imply that human beings are in no way better
than animals and should, and can, only pursue the same ignoble ends
as they do. Thus, it is claimed, utilitarianism is ‘a doctrine worthy only
of swine’.
What Mill needs to do in order to refute this objection is to show
that, even though perhaps not all pleasures are noble and good (that
is, worthy of being desired and pursued by a human being), there are
some that definitely are, and to the greatest possible extent, so that
there is in fact nothing better and nobler to desire and pursue than
those pleasures.
Mill begins to launch his counter-argument by making the fairly
obvious point that humans are capable of other pleasures than swine.
Moreover, not only are they capable thereof, but these other pleasures
are also constitutive of their well-being and happiness. In other words,
in order to be happy a human being requires other things, and perhaps
more things, than a swine does. ‘Human beings have faculties more
elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious
of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include
their gratification.’6 So a human life that is rich in animal pleasures
but contains none or few of these other pleasures that are specifically
human would, all things considered, not be a happy life after all.
Something important would be missing in such a life, and would also
be felt as missing. Since happiness, for the utilitarian, is nothing but
pleasure this can only mean that despite frequent bouts of intense
pleasure, caused by the ongoing gratification of animal desires, some
displeasure will eventually creep in and shift the overall balance of
pleasure and pain toward the latter. Thus we may enjoy having good
sex and good food as often as we like, but if there is nothing else in
our lives we will, after a while, more likely than not become bored and
depressed. Because of the way we are constructed, we require other,
specifically human pleasures in order to become, and remain, satisfied
with our lives and thus happy.
5 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (CW),
vol. 10, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto and London, 1969), p. 210.
6 Utilitarianism, CW 10, pp. 210–11.
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So far Mill’s reply is not only fairly plausible, but also entirely
consistent with his professed hedonism. There is no need for there to
be only one kind of pleasure. If human pleasures are (partly) different
from animal pleasures, not only in the sense that they derive from
different sources (for instance reading a book, which is unlikely to
please a pig), but also in the sense that they have a different intrinsic
phenomenological quality, then we can acknowledge the existence of
different kinds of pleasure without compromising our hedonistic theory
of life and value. It does seem, after all, that the pleasure we derive from
eating when we are hungry is not of the same kind as the pleasure we
derive from reading a good book. The two pleasures may well be equally
intense, and endure for an equally long time, but may nonetheless
be different in the way they are experienced. In that sense we can
then speak of different qualities of pleasure. If we accept this, then
utilitarianism is clearly no philosophy ‘worthy only of swine’ in the
sense that it recognizes only those pleasures as desirable that swine
are capable of experiencing. So utilitarians should have no difficulty in
agreeing with their critics’ insistence that humans are not swine.
II. HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES
However, this assurance does not quite meet the concern that is
expressed in the objection. In order to counter the objection, it needs to
be shown not only that utilitarianism allows for a difference between
human and animal pleasures, but also that human pleasures are
in some way higher, better or nobler, that is, more worthy of being
desired and pursued (not merely for humans because of the way they
are constituted, but in themselves) than animal pleasures. It is not
sufficient to recognize that humans and animals are different with
respect to the kinds of pleasure they seek and require. In addition, it
must be shown that those pleasures are not merely different in kind,
but also in value.7 In other words, the life of a human being who enjoys
plenty of specifically human pleasures has to be not only different from
that of a swine (which enjoys plenty of swine pleasures), but it must
also be in itself better, i.e. more worthy of being lived. This would mean
that if I could choose between the life of a human and the life of a swine,
7 Cf. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 184: ‘No one of course can doubt that pleasures
admit of distinction in quality according to the conditions under which they arise. So
Plato and Aristotle distinguished pleasures incidental to the satisfaction of bodily wants
from pleasures of sight or hearing, and these again from the pleasures of pure intellect.
. . . The question is in what sense, upon the principle that pleasure is the ultimate good
by relation to which all other good is to be tested, these differences of kind between
pleasures may be taken to constitute any difference in the degree of their goodness or
desirability.’
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I would be well advised to choose that of a human.8 And if the swine
had the opportunity to become human, it too, if it knew what was good
for it, would no doubt do so. For it is better to be a human than a swine.
This is the consideration that Mill tries to accommodate within the
framework of utilitarianism by making the bold move of introducing
the idea of different qualities of pleasure. That two pleasures have
a different quality does not mean that they feel differently (i.e. that
they have different phenomenological qualities), but instead that
certain kinds of pleasure are (in some unspecified way) superior
to others. He explicitly mentions three such kinds, the ‘pleasures
of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral
sentiments’,9 to all of which, Mill believes, we rightly assign ‘a much
higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation’. This higher
value is independent of the pleasure’s circumstantial, or quantitative,
properties. While a pleasure of the intellect (such as reading a book,
or, presumably, an academic article on Mill) may be far less intense
than a bodily pleasure (such as, say, having a sexual orgasm), it will
still be superior to it, and intrinsically ‘more valuable’. Mill claims that
this statement is ‘quite compatible with the principle of utility’ (and,
we may assume, also with the underlying doctrine that pleasure and
freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends).
Problem no. 1: quality as a place holder
But what exactly does Mill mean when he says that one pleasure can
be qualitatively superior to another, i.e. ‘more valuable’, regardless of
its quantitative properties? Normally, when we talk about the quality
of things in an evaluative sense, we can account for alleged differences
in quality by referring to differences in quantity (in a wide sense). For
instance, a car can be said to be of a higher quality than another if it
lasts longer, is more robust or elegant, faster, easier to handle, safer, etc.
This means that we can spell out what makes it a better car. But what
makes an intellectual pleasure better (more desirable and valuable)
than a pleasure of the senses? In what way is it better? Unfortunately,
Mill never answers this question directly. He doesn’t even try. Instead,
he tells us that the better of two kinds of pleasure is the one to which
8 The situation would thus be similar to the one that the dead face after each life cycle
according to the myth of Er that Plato relates in the last book of the Republic. However,
for Plato it appears to be less certain than for Mill that being human is preferable to all
other life forms. Being completely free to choose any form of life they desire for their next
incarnation, Plato’s dead each make a different choice. Although there are some animals
who decide to become human, there are also, contrary to what Mill should expect, many
humans who elect to become an animal. Orpheus, for instance, chose to spend his next
life as a swan, the Telamonian Ajax as a lion and Agamemnon as an eagle. At least for
now, they have all had enough of being human.
9 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 211.
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those who are familiar with both (for instance all who have read, and
are willing to discuss, Mill) ‘give a decided preference, irrespective of
any moral obligation to prefer it’. However, this is a rather strange and
unsatisfactory answer for various reasons. The main problem with it is
of course that it does not tell us what we wanted to know, namely what
precisely it is by virtue of which a certain kind of pleasure can be said
to have a higher value than another.
Suppose someone declared a certain kind of car far superior in quality
than all others. Since you know nothing whatsoever about cars you ask
him what he means by that. The answer you get is the following: ‘Of
two cars, if there is one to which all or almost all people who have
experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling
of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable car.’ This
would mean, in practice, that if you want to know which car is best, you
should ask your local car dealer. However, since your local car dealer
will not always be inclined to tell you what he really thinks is the better
car, you may want to see instead what car he is driving himself. By this
method you may actually end up buying a decent, high-quality car. Yet
even if you trust the judgement of the presumed expert, you will still
assume that your new car is not better because it is being preferred by
the expert, but rather that it is being preferred by him because it is
the better car. In other words, it is not the car dealer’s judgement that
makes it a better car.
Similarly, we must assume that if those who are familiar with two
kinds of pleasure consistently prefer the one to the other, then there is
something in those pleasures that distinguishes them and makes one
of them more desirable than the other. However, the problem is that
Mill does not tell us what this something is. The alleged difference in
quality is not tangible in any way and remains obscure throughout the
argument.10 The word ‘quality’ is in fact nothing but a place-holder, an
x, a je-ne-sais-quoi, and just as elusive and indeterminable as Kant’s
thing-in-itself. To suggest (as Mill no doubt does11) that intellectual
pleasures are more desirable and more valuable because they are of a
higher quality is like saying that they are more valuable because they
are more valuable.12 We have learned nothing new. Mill’s argument
10 It is rather astounding that this is hardly ever noticed or remarked upon by modern
critics. And even when it is, it does not seem to be considered a serious objection to Mill’s
argument. Guy Fletcher for instance admits that ‘the notion of quality remains somewhat
mysterious’ (Guy Fletcher, ‘Qualitative Hedonism and Malicious Pleasures’, Utilitas 20.4
(2008), pp. 462–71, at 467), but nonetheless defends Mill’s qualitative hedonism against
Bradley and Moore as completely consistent.
11 For a different view see Christoph Schmidt-Petri, ‘Mill on Quality and Quantity’, The
Philosophical Quarterly 53/ 210 (2003), pp. 102–4.
12 Wendy Donner claims that Mill assigns a ‘consistent meaning’ to the notion of quality,
and that quality should not be taken to be synonymous with value. Rather, quality is
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here is actually the philosophical equivalent of a sleight of hand. The
reader is led to believe that Mill has given her an explanation, while
in fact he has done no such thing. This vacuity is the first and main
problem with Mill’s conception of quality.
Problem no. 2: the competent judge’s preference
The second problem is that it is virtually impossible to reconcile Mill’s
account of how the quality of a pleasure can be determined with our
actual experience. Mill maintains that a pleasure A is of a higher
quality than a pleasure B if those acquainted with both give a ‘decided
preference’ to A. But what exactly is a decided preference? ‘If one of the
two’, Mill continues to explain,
is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the
other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater
amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other
pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the
preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to
render it, in comparison, of small account.13
So pleasure A is more valuable than pleasure B if A is being preferred
to B irrespective of quantity. By ‘prefer’ I take Mill not to mean that
the competent judge simply declares a certain kind of pleasure to be
superior to another (which may easily be explained by the expert’s
‘feeling of moral obligation to prefer it’), but rather that they also act in
accordance with their judgement, that is, actively pursue the pleasure
they believe to be superior whenever that is possible. It would be odd
to say of someone who is entirely free to choose between A and B,
and chooses B, that she actually prefers A. So in order to show that I
really do ‘prefer’ – decidedly prefer, that is – pleasure A to pleasure B,
I would, if given the choice between the two, always and without much
hesitation have to choose A.
Now let us pause for a moment and see how plausible this is. Let
us take a clear low-quality pleasure like the kind of pleasure that
people commonly derive from engaging in sexual activities, and a high-
quality pleasure like the kind of pleasure that some people derive from
going to the opera and attending a performance of, say, Mozart’s Magic
‘just another ordinary property’ that contributes to value, just as quantity does. The
term ‘quality’ has to be understood as ‘that additional good-making characteristic of
pleasures’ (Donner, ‘Mill’s Utilitarianism’, p. 263). However, Donner fails to explain what
this property is, except that it is something that makes pleasures good (or better than
others). We would want to know, though, why it makes pleasures good, or what exactly
makes them good. In the absence of such a reason, Donner’s explanation is just as helpful
as the Doctor’s explanation in Molie`re’s Le Malade Imaginaire, who, when asked why
opium makes people sleep, replies that it possesses a vis dormativa, i.e. a sleep-making
power.
13 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 211.
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Flute (which engages the ‘higher’ faculties of the intellect and the
imagination). Since people only rarely are lucky enough to have sex
while attending a public Mozart performance, in most cases they will
have to choose between the two. If we take seriously what Mill said
about our alleged decided preference for the so-called higher pleasures,
then it seems that, when given the choice, we will always choose the
opera. Yet this is obviously not true. Even if I happen to like the opera,
and Mozart particularly, and am quite capable of deriving considerable
pleasure from the experience, I might still, on occasion, prefer to have
sex instead. How I decide on a given occasion clearly depends on the
circumstances: on how long I haven’t been to the opera (and how long I
haven’t had sex), whether I have already paid for the tickets, whether
I will have another chance to see that particular performance (and
another chance to have sex in the near future, or with that particular
person), etc. So I don’t seem to have a clear preference for certain kinds
of pleasure, and I suppose most people will, in their actual practice, be
similarly undecided or changeable. If it were otherwise, then, given that
intellectual pleasures are not hard to get hold of (there’s always a good
book that we could read or re-read), we should expect that most people
never have sex at all, which is clearly not the case. Last time I looked,
it was still a popular pastime, even among academics. And even if there
was someone who would, when given the choice, in most, or perhaps
even in all, cases choose the opera over sex, it is rather unlikely that
he would not, as Mill would have him do, resign this pleasure ‘for
any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of’. I
am quite sure that, for most people, the promise of unlimited sexual
pleasure of the utmost humanly possible intensity beats the prospect of
listening to Mozart (or reading philosophical articles on Mill) any time.
To salvage Mill’s account of ‘decided preference’, one may want to
argue that Mill never thought we could determine the quality of a
pleasure simply by looking at what people actually prefer to do in
concrete situations. Rather than choosing, over and over again, between
different pleasures, we in fact make a choice between different kinds
of life, and that is where we show our preference, since those who have
had some experience of a life that also engages their higher faculties are
unlikely to want to exchange it for a life that is devoid of such pleasures.
Mill himself suggests this interpretation when he goes on to say that
it ‘is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted
with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give
a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs
their higher faculties’.14
14 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 211 (my italics).
No Philosophy for Swine 435
However, although this may well be true (why else should I bother
writing this article, and you reading it?), it doesn’t show what it is
supposed to show, namely that some pleasures are more valuable, in
fact infinitely more valuable, than others. I may not want to live the
life of an oyster, no matter how long and pleasant it is.15 Yet I would
not be very keen to live the life of a thinking machine either, that is
a life rich in intellectual pleasures and pleasures of the imagination,
but also utterly devoid of all others. If my fairy godmother came to me
and offered me a life of never-ending sexual pleasures if I only agreed
never to read another book in my life, no doubt I would decline the
offer. But if she came back and offered me unlimited access to all books
ever written, and enough time to read them, provided that I agree
never again to enjoy sexual pleasures or any other bodily pleasures,
I would almost certainly also decline. The point is that both kinds of
pleasure are important to us and requisite to our happiness. From the
fact that most of us would not want to be a happy oyster, nothing follows
about the superiority of intellectual pleasures, as long as we are equally
reluctant (as I, for one, am) to give up our human, embodied existence
and become a brain-in-the-vat instead.
III. TEMPTATION, INFIRMITY OF CHARACTER
AND BAD HABITS
Now Mill is of course aware that most people most of the time do in fact
not prefer the alleged higher pleasures, and do not even prefer with any
consistency a manner of existence that is particularly devoted to them.
Even those who are well acquainted with the higher pleasures often
pursue the lower ones. Mill tries to explain this rather surprising fact
by reference to what was traditionally known as the ‘weakness of the
will’, which was already controversially debated by Plato and Aristotle.
Mill, however, seems to be uncertain whether to side with the one or
with the other. While Plato had his Socrates argue that nobody would do
anything bad (or morally wrong) if he only knew it was bad (or morally
wrong) and that therefore nobody did anything wrong knowingly and
voluntarily,16 Aristotle insisted that people who did wrong generally
had a pretty good idea that it was wrong and thus clearly acted out of
their own free will.17
Mill, blaming the general lack of commitment to what he thinks
of as the higher manner of existence on temptation and infirmity of
character, starts out as an Aristotelian when he claims that people’s
15 See Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London, 1997), pp. 24–5.
16 Plato, Protagoras 345d.
17 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, 1145b 21; VII.11, 1152a 15.
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actual preference for the lower pleasures is ‘quite compatible with a
full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher’ and that
they choose a lower good ‘though they know it to be less valuable’.18
In other words, even when people in fact prefer a lower pleasure to a
higher one, they still know which one is higher and which lower, and
then they also know, even if they don’t actually pursue the higher one,
that they actually should pursue it. However, if that is true, then it is a
mystery why people do in fact not pursue the pleasure that they know
is more valuable (to them).
Probably for this reason Mill contradicts himself almost immediately
and adopts a more Platonic stance when he confesses not to believe
that those who lose ‘their youthful enthusiasm for everything noble’
‘voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to
the higher’.19 Rather, they have become incapable of enjoying the higher
pleasures, and only then do they cease pursuing them entirely:
Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily
killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in
the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which
their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown
them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise.20
Yet having become incapable of enjoying a higher pleasure surely
implies no longer regarding it as a pleasure. If I can’t enjoy reading
Mill any more, then, for me, reading Mill no longer seems to be a
pleasure at all. I may still feel that I should be reading Mill (and may
wish that I’d enjoy reading him), but surely I can no longer believe
that the pleasure of reading Mill is intrinsically, considered only as a
pleasure, of a higher quality than the pleasure of, say, drinking beer in
front of the television – since I am no longer able to see it as a pleasure
in the first place. Therefore it is rather unlikely that someone in whom
the ‘tender plant’ of the nobler feelings has died will still enjoy a ‘full
appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher’ pleasures. But be
that as it may, the fact remains that, knowingly or unknowingly, many
people actually do prefer the lower pleasures.
Problem no. 3: telling competent from incompetent judges
The purpose of the above-sketched argument from infirmity of
character was to allow Mill to make a case for discounting such weak-
willed people and to persuade the reader that, although many may be
18 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 212.
19 Utilitarianism, CW 10, pp. 212–13 (my italics).
20 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 213.
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acquainted with both the lower and the higher pleasures, not all of
them are really competent judges at all.21 Perhaps they once were, but
they are not anymore. A competent judge is someone who ‘has remained
equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures’, and Mill shows himself
convinced that no such judge would ever ‘knowingly and calmly’ prefer
the lower.22
So where does that leave us? Let me recapitulate. We are still trying
to give a clear meaning to the notion of a quantity-independent, value-
conferring quality of pleasures, which Mill introduced in response
to the charge that utilitarianism was a philosophy ‘worthy only of
swine’. Instead of telling us directly what makes one pleasure more
valuable than another (and thus worthy of being pursued by humans),
independent of quantity, Mill referred us to the ‘competent judges’,
whose preference is indicative of higher-quality pleasures. So what
is meant by a ‘higher-quality’ pleasure is the kind of pleasure that
a competent judge would prefer. A competent judge appeared to be
someone who was acquainted with both the lower-quality and the
higher-quality pleasures. Yet many people who seem to meet this
criterion do in fact prefer pleasures that Mill considers to be of a
lower quality. This poses an obvious problem to the theory. When all
that ‘higher-quality pleasure’ means is that it is such that people with
enough experience tend to prefer it, yet those who appear to have that
experience do in fact not prefer what Mill believes to be the higher
pleasures, then it seems that we don’t really know at all what ‘higher
quality’ means. To solve the problem, Mill claims that people who prefer
the lower pleasures, though they are indeed acquainted with the higher
ones, have been corrupted and can therefore be discounted. Competent
judges are in fact only those who are still capable of appreciating the
higher pleasures. But how do we recognize these competent judges?
How can we tell competent and incompetent judges apart? The only
answer that can be taken from what Mill actually says is that if they
actually prefer the higher pleasures to the lower (by actively pursuing
them), then they are obviously still capable of appreciating them and
should hence count as competent judges.
The problem with this argument (and this is the third problem with
Mill’s qualitative hedonism that we discuss) is of course that it is
21 There is an elitist tendency in Mill to find only ‘cultivated’ people worth considering.
Thus, in his study Auguste Comte and Positivism, in which he clearly sympathizes with
Comte’s religion of humanity, he recommends that, so that ‘the ennobling power of this
grand conception may have its full efficacy, we . . . regard the Grand Eˆtre, Humanity,
or Mankind, as composed, in the past, solely of those who, in every age and variety of
position, have played their part worthily in life. . . . The unworthy members of it are best
dismissed from our habitual thoughts’ (CW 10, p. 334).
22 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 213.
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blatantly circular. We are told that in order to find out what kinds
of pleasure are most valuable we need to ask competent judges which
they prefer, and when we ask who is a competent judge we are told
that competent judges are those, and only those, who prefer the higher
kinds of pleasure. The whole argument from infirmity of character
already presupposes a knowledge of which pleasures are higher and
which lower, since the very reason why someone is declared to suffer
from infirmity of character is that she prefers those pleasures that
Mill considers of a low quality. The circular structure of the argument
makes it impossible to determine the different qualities of pleasure by
following Mill’s suggestion.
This is already bad enough. However, it gets even worse. Let us
assume that somehow we have figured out who is a competent judge
and who is not, and we ask them ‘which is the best worth having
of two pleasures’. Then, according to Mill, ‘the judgement of those
who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the
majority among them, must be admitted as final.’23 Now, this is again
a very strange claim. Since we have already eliminated all those whose
judgement is, for some reason or other, distorted and unreliable, then
one should think that those who are left must all be equally competent
to give us a definite answer to the question of which kinds of pleasure
are more valuable, and which less. How then should it be possible
that a minority of those competent judges may actually disagree with
the majority? How should it be possible that even one of those judges
disagrees with the rest? And if there can be, inexplicably, competent
judges who disagree and actually prefer what Mill sees as a lower
pleasure to what he sees as a higher pleasure, then there does not
seem to be a good reason why these dissenting judges should not be the
majority after all. Yet if that is a real possibility, and Mill does not give
us any reason at all to think that it is not, then we cannot even rely on
competent judges to tell us which kinds of pleasure are of a higher, and
which of a lower, quality.
The conclusion is that Mill’s whole argument fails miserably. We
still have no idea whatsoever what the alleged difference in quality
between an intellectual pleasure and a bodily pleasure actually consists
in, and we don’t even have a reliable way of distinguishing the alleged
‘higher’ from the alleged ‘lower’ pleasures. The claim that those who are
acquainted with both kinds of pleasure will ‘prefer’ the intellectual to
the bodily is clearly counterfactual. It does not state how things actually
are (what people do, feel or think), but instead how (Mill thinks that)
23 Utilitarianism, CW 10, 213 (my italics).
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things ought to be, i.e. what pleasures people ought to pursue, or what
they ought to find pleasure in.
IV. A MORE PLEASANT LIFE?
Several critics have tried to fill the explanatory gap left by Mill’s
failure to lend content to the notion of a quantity-independent ‘quality’
of pleasures that is supposed to lift some kinds of pleasure above
others. Because it seems to preserve the consistency of Mill’s professed
hedonism, the most popular way of doing this is by declaring that a life
devoted to the pursuit of the higher pleasures is simply more pleasant
than a life that lacks them and is dominated by the lower pleasures
instead.
Thus Rex Martin has argued that according to Mill ‘the kinds
of pleasant life differ in their degree of being pleasant’,24 and in
nothing else. Even though the individual pleasures themselves do not
necessarily differ in terms of pleasantness, the respective lives do.
When Mill claims that being Socrates dissatisfied is still better than
being a satisfied fool, thereby getting dangerously close to discarding
the hedonistic theory of life that utilitarians officially adhere to, Martin
interprets Mill as implying that ‘Socrates is pleasured in a different and
more pleasant way than is the fool’.25 Henry West agrees with Martin’s
reading of Mill, but argues that if a life involving the use of the higher
cognitive capacities is more pleasant than one in which they are not
used, then this can only be because ‘in some or most cases mental
pleasures per se are more pleasant than bodily ones’.26 There are, in
West’s view, some experiences that, without being more intense, just
‘feel better’ than others.27
Jonathan Riley develops this view further when he declares Mill to
be a consistent hedonist who believed that higher-quality pleasures
were ‘infinitely more pleasant’28 than lower-quality pleasures: ‘Fewer
units of a higher-quality pleasure still amount to more pleasure than
any finite number of units of lower-quality pleasure because units of
the higher pleasure are intrinsically or infinitely greater than units of
24 Rex Martin, ‘A Defence of Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism’, Philosophy 47 (1972),
pp. 140–51, at 146.
25 Martin, ‘A Defence of Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism’, p. 147.
26 Henry R. West, ‘Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism’, Philosophy 51 (1976), pp. 97–101, at
99.
27 West, ‘Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism’, p. 100.
28 Jonathan Riley, ‘Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I’, Utilitas
20.3 (2008), pp. 257–78, at 278.
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the lower.’29 Riley argues that it is the infinite distance between two
kinds of pleasure that saves Mill from inconsistency:
It is clear that the only way to construct a coherent pluralistic hedonism along
Mill’s lines is to define qualitative superiority as infinite superiority: a pleasant
feeling is superior in quality to another if and only if the higher pleasure is
infinitely superior in value to the lower pleasure as pleasure.30
There are several passages in Mill’s writings that may be seen to
support such attempts to reconcile the hedonistic theory of life with
what Mill says about the quality of pleasures. He often points out that
without access to the higher pleasures – which requires the uninhibited
cultivation of our cognitive, aesthetic, and moral capacities – we cannot
be truly happy. In Utilitarianism, for instance, he remarks that next
to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of
mental cultivation. A cultivated mind . . . finds sources of inexhaustible interest
in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the
imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and
present, and their prospects in the future.31
Moreover, in his early Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy, Mill
stresses the importance of a lively interest in the welfare of our fellow
beings for the attainment of personal happiness:
There are, and have been, multitudes, in whom the motive of conscience or
moral obligation has been thus paramount. There is nothing in the constitution
of human nature to forbid its being so in all mankind. Until it is so, the race will
never enjoy one-tenth part of the happiness which our nature is susceptible of.
Without social interests, without a moral state of mind our enjoyment of life
can be but poor and scanty.32
However, this surplus value of the higher-quality pleasures can easily
be explained in terms of the elements of Bentham’s felicific calculus,
that is, as a purely quantitative advantage. Lower-quality pleasures
tend to be intense, but are also rather short-lived, often followed by
states of displeasure, and don’t give rise to other pleasures so much.
In other words, they are deficient with respect to duration, fecundity
and purity. So in order to account for this difference in kinds of
pleasure, there is no need at all to introduce quality as something
other than (and superior to) quantity.33 Mill himself occasionally
29 Jonathan Riley, ‘Interpreting Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism’, The Philosophical
Quarterly 53 (2003), pp. 410–18, at 416.
30 Jonathan Riley, ‘Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part II’,
Utilitas 21.2 (2009), pp. 127–43, at 128.
31 Utilitarianism, CW 10, pp. 215–16.
32 Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy, CW 10, p. 15.
33 Cf. Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 118–19 [1927 in n. 1], who puts this point rather
nicely: ‘The “higher pleasure” is here the pleasure which contains in itself most degrees
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distinguishes quite clearly between human happiness, which requires
a rich variety of pleasures including the so-called ‘higher’ ones, and
human nobility, which despite requiring the same variety, is not
identical with happiness:
Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure,
their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical
and moral agencies, that unless there is corresponding diversity in their modes
of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the
mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.34
The wording suggests that although a person’s ‘mental, moral, and
aesthetic stature’ may well contribute to her happiness, it cannot be
understood as that contribution. Happiness is one thing, and nobility
or ‘mental, moral and aesthetic stature’ quite another, but for Mill
equally important.
The proposal that we understand Mill’s notion of a higher-quality
pleasure as meaning simply a particularly pleasant kind of pleasure is
implausible for several reasons. First of all, Mill never says anywhere
that a higher-quality pleasure is more pleasant than a lower-quality
pleasure. If he had meant that, he could have said so, but he didn’t.
Why not?
Second, the claim that a certain kind of pleasure is more pleasant
despite not being more intense or more lasting is both incomprehensible
and contrary to the evidence provided by our experience. Does anyone
really believe that reading Mill is in some way more pleasant than
having a sexual orgasm? In what way exactly? It ‘feels better’, claims
West, but does it really? We may occasionally prefer reading Mill to
having an orgasm for all sorts of reasons, but none of them has got
anything to do with the reading being more pleasant than the orgasm.
This is simply an absurd distortion of the facts of experience, and the
claim does not get any clearer, or more persuasive, if we qualify it
by adding, as Riley does, that the higher-quality pleasure is not just
more pleasant, but rather ‘infinitely more pleasant’, than the lower-
quality pleasure. While we have at least some idea of what it means
for one activity or experience to be more pleasant than another, I very
of pleasure, or which contributes on the whole to the existence of a larger number of
degrees of pleasure. Here the principle of the greatest amount of pleasure is adhered
to; that is the top, and what approaches to it or contributes to it is nearer the top. But
since the moral “higher” is here, as we see, the more pleasurable or the means to the
more pleasurable, we come in the end to the amount, the quantity of pleasure without
distinction of kind or quality; and having already seen that such an end is not a moral
end, we get nothing from the phrases “higher” and “lower” unless it be confusion.’
34 On Liberty, CW 18, p. 270 (my italics).
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much doubt that we have a clear understanding of what it means for a
pleasure to be ‘infinitely’ more pleasant than another.35
At any rate, reading Mill seems to be neither more pleasant, nor
infinitely more pleasant, than having a sexual orgasm, by any known
standard of pleasantness. Yet no doubt Mill would think of sexual
pleasure as a lower-quality pleasure, and of studying philosophy as
a higher-quality pleasure, from which it follows that he cannot have
meant what sympathetic critics like Riley claim he did.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, if all that Mill meant by
higher quality is that a particular kind of pleasure was more pleasant
than another, then he would not have solved the problem that made
him introduce the notion of quality in the first place, namely that
utilitarianism appears to undermine the distinction between animals
and humans in terms of the value of their lives, and the deeply
entrenched idea that it is per se better to be a human than a swine, and
not simply because the life of a human is potentially more pleasurable
than the life of a swine, but because it is nobler. A more pleasant kind
of pleasure, even an infinitely more pleasant one, would not in itself
be more worthy of being desired and pursued than a less pleasant
one. Humans would still be like swine in the sense that they both
desire as much pleasure as their nature is capable of, and nothing
else.
V. MILL’S THEORY OF HUMAN LIFE
The first question in regard to any man of speculation is, what is his theory of
human life? In the minds of many philosophers, whatever theory they have of
this sort is latent, and it would be a revelation to themselves to have it pointed
out to them in their writings as others can see it, unconsciously moulding
everything to its own likeness.36
35 Riley, ‘Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part II’, p. 129, confuses
the issue even further when he claims that the higher pleasures are infinitely more
pleasant by being infinitely more intense: ‘In effect, Mill’s hedonistic innovation is to
enlarge the meaning of “intensity” so that it covers not only the finite superiority of a
larger quantity over a smaller quantity of pleasure of the same kind but also the infinite
superiority of a higher quality of pleasure over a lower. A higher pleasure is infinitely
more intense than a lower pleasure, keeping in mind that the feeling of “infinitely more
intense” (that is, qualitative superiority) may not actually feel (and is not required to feel)
anything like the feeling of “finitely more intense” (that is quantitative superiority).’ In
other words, an infinitely more intense pleasure doesn’t feel more intense at all. In what
sense then is it more intense? Apparently in the sense of being more valuable. That
would mean, though, that we cannot explain the alleged greater value of the pleasure in
terms of its greater intensity. It remains unexplained and cannot be accounted for by the
utilitarian theory that Mill defends.
36 Bentham, CW 10, p. 94.
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Mill had Bentham in mind when he wrote this, but it is equally
true of himself. In his heart Mill was no hedonist, although he publicly
embraced hedonism and never rejected it openly or even knowingly.
He certainly tried hard to be one, but couldn’t quite bring himself to
embrace it unreservedly. Utilitarianism was his attempt to persuade
not only his readers, but also himself, that ethical hedonism is the
correct theory of life. But he never really believed that it was. He
certainly defended, as David O. Brink has pointed out, ‘a conception of
human happiness whose dominant component consists in the exercise
of one’s rational capacities’,37 whereby, for Mill, the activity has a value
in itself, independent of the pleasure that can be derived from it. Mill
clearly believed that there were higher and lower ways of existing.
He claimed that although a human is ‘capable probably of more acute
suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more points’, ‘he can never
really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.’38
That is why Socrates, even in his darkest days, when the exercise of his
intellectual abilities led him to the brink of an untimely death, could
not really wish that he had been born a fool. That is why no human,
no matter how unhappy he is, can ever really wish to be a swine. Not
because even the unhappiest human was still happier than the happiest
pig (let alone ‘infinitely’ more happy), but because ultimately there are
things in life that matter more to us than happiness or pleasurable
experiences. If we have to live the life of a pig in order to have such
experiences, then the price is simply too high.
Humans, Mill believed, were not only capable of but also meant
for a higher form of life. He believed that dignity was of the utmost
importance, a feeling of self-worth that is not only constitutive of our
well-being, but justified by what we do and what we are. Mill criticized
Bentham for referring to ‘self-respect’ not even once in all his works,
and for talking about the ‘springs of action’ without ever mentioning
the ‘sense of honour, and personal dignity – that feeling of personal
exaltation and degradation which acts independently of other people’s
opinion, or even in defiance of it’.39 This ‘sense of dignity’ is the reason
why we (or many of us) do not want to live like pigs, why we want to
exercise our mental and not merely our physical faculties. No doubt,
as Mill points out, this sense of dignity forms an essential part of our
happiness, but only ‘in those in whom it is strong’.40 This admits of
the possibility that those in whom the sense of dignity is not strong, or
37 David O. Brink, ‘Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs
21.1 (1992), pp. 67–103, at 68.
38 Utilitarianism, CW, p. 212.
39 Bentham, CW 10, pp. 95–6.
40 Utilitarianism, CW 10, p. 212.
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who lack it entirely, may thoroughly enjoy living the life of a pig, for
dignity is not an essential part of their happiness. Nonetheless they
may rightly be pitied for not living the life of a human, not because it
is less pleasurable, but because it is a ‘low grade of existence’.
Mill clearly advocates a certain ideal of human nature. He sees
humans not primarily as what they are, but rather as what they might
become. He has only praise for the ‘Greek ideal of self-development’41
and the ‘great duty’ of self-culture,42 and claims that ‘the duty of man
is the same in respect to his own nature as in respect to the nature of
all other things, namely not to follow but to amend it.’43 Human beings
have a task to fulfil, and that task is not primarily the maximization
of happiness. Instead they must bring themselves ‘nearer to the best
thing they can be’,44 ‘nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature’.45
Mill certainly believes that self-improvement will increase our
happiness (that is, both our own personal happiness and the happiness
of others with whom we share our lives), but that is not the only
reason why we should strive for it. We will be happier, but also
more worthy of being happy because the activities and experiences
that make up our happiness will be, in themselves, more worthy
of being pursued. Mill sees ‘man himself ’ as ‘struggling upwards
against immense natural difficulties, into civilization, and making to
himself a second nature, far better and more unselfish than he was
created with’.46 He even encourages us to find our ideal or standard
of excellence in Jesus Christ, who can show us how to reach, not
more pleasure, but ‘truth and virtue’.47 He prefaces On Liberty with a
quote by Wilhelm von Humboldt: ‘The grand, leading principle, towards
which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is
the absolute and essential importance of human development in its
richest diversity.’48 The whole essay on liberty is an argument for
the cultivation of individuality, which Mill is convinced is needed to
make sure that ‘human beings become a noble and beautiful object of
contemplation’, and the race (i.e. the species) to which the individual
41 On Liberty, CW 18, p. 266.
42 Bentham, CW 10, p. 98.
43 Nature, CW 10, p. 397.
44 On Liberty, CW 18, p. 267.
45 On Liberty, CW 18, p. 278.
46 Theism, CW 10, p. 459.
47 Theism, CW 10, p. 488. Although decidedly hostile and frequently unjust in her
reading of Mill, Linda C. Raeder has a point when she insists that the ‘aim of Benthamite
utilitarianism, certainly in the hands of the morally impassioned Mills, was not pleasure
or happiness but virtue’ (John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity (Columbia and
London, 2002), p. 15).
48 Quoted in On Liberty, CW 18, p. 215.
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belongs ‘infinitely better worth belonging to’.49 Alan Ryan hit the
mark when, forty years ago, he declared that ‘Mill’s concern with self-
development and moral progress is a strand in his philosophy to which
almost everything else is subordinate’ and that his goals transcend
utilitarian principles ‘and can only be described as the freely pursued
life of personal nobility’.50
VI. CONCLUSION
Those who accused utilitarianism of being a ‘philosophy worthy only of
swine’ thought that utilitarians were unable to account for the common
intuition that it is better to be a human than an animal, and better to
be an intelligent, morally responsible being than a vicious fool. They
were wrong. As Plato did before them, utilitarians can always argue
that both stupidity and injustice, or a lack of concern for the welfare
of one’s fellow-beings, generally prevent people from being truly happy.
An intellectual and moral life is simply more pleasant than one that is
devoted largely to the satisfaction of physical desires. This is of course
an empirical claim that may or may not be true. If it is not (and if we
can clearly demonstrate that it is not, which might prove impossible),
then utilitarians can still insist that the most pleasant life is the best
life, but they can no longer, with Mill, claim that an intellectual and
moral life is better than a life lived in the pursuit of, say, ‘sex, drugs and
rock’n’roll’. However, if the empirical claim is true, then the utilitarian
is entirely justified in declaring a life devoted to the ‘higher’ pleasures
far better than a life devoted to the ‘lower’ ones. For the purpose of this
article, however, what is important is that, as long as the contrary has
not been proved, a utilitarian can accept and defend the claim that it
is better to be a human than an animal without having to compromise
her hedonistic assumptions. And Mill did just that.
However, what a utilitarian cannot do is show that the life of a human
being is better than the life of an animal in the sense of being nobler or
more dignified. Most people do not only feel that the life of a human is,
on average or potentially, more pleasurable than the life of an animal,
but also, or even more so, that humans are, in some unspecified way,
better off than animals. This is the reason why many people may not
want to swap their life for that of a swine even when they are very
unhappy and the life of the swine, in comparison, much happier. People
do indeed tend to believe that it is better to be Socrates unsatisfied
than a pig satisfied. Mill shared this intuition, the deeply ingrained
49 On Liberty, CW 18, p. 266.
50 Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (London, 1970), p. 255.
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belief in the inherent superiority of the human mode of existence, and
he tried to account for it by declaring some kinds of pleasure to be of
a higher quality, and hence intrinsically more worthy of being desired,
than others. Unfortunately for him, and for utilitarianism, his attempt
failed. Either utilitarianism and the hedonistic theory of life on which
it is based are true, in which case ultimately it doesn’t matter what
we are (a human or a pig, an intellectual or a blockhead) and what we
do (reading philosophy or having sex) as long as we are happy (and
we don’t compromise the happiness of others);51 or, happy or not, it
does matter what we are and do (i.e. what kinds of pleasure we pursue,
without taking the degree of pleasantness into account), in which case
utilitarianism cannot be true. Mill tried to achieve the impossible: to
embrace both hedonism and the belief that humans are very special
and essentially very different from swine.
m.hauskeller@exeter.ac.uk
51 By this I of course do not mean that, for the utilitarian, it doesn’t matter at all
what we do. Obviously, an action that is conducive to general happiness (including the
happiness of animals) is better than an action that is not, and the more conducive it
is, the better it is from a utilitarian point of view. However, whether I contribute to
the general happiness by producing and distributing exciting video action games or by
creating great works of art should not matter to the utilitarian as long as the amount of
happiness produced is the same.
